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Abstract
We develop a model of commodity tax competition with monopolistically com-
petitive internationally mobile ﬁrms, transport costs, and asymmetric country sizes.
We investigate the impacts of non-cooperative tax setting, as well as of tax harmo-
nization and changes in the tax principle, in both the short and the long run. The
origin principle, when compared to the destination principle, is shown to exacerbate
tax competition and to erode tax revenues, yet leads to a more equal spatial distri-
bution of economic activity. This suggests that federations which care about spatial
inequality, like the European Union, face a non-trivial choice for their tax principle
that goes beyond the standard considerations of tax revenue redistribution.
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21 Introduction
Increases in factor mobility and economic integration more generally have given rise in
the European Union (henceforth, EU) to concerns about the possibilities of tax competi-
tion eroding governments’ ability to ﬁnance public expenditure and to maintain the welfare
state. Devolution of responsibility for public services to regions within Europe has arguably
further increased opportunities for harmful tax competition, both within and between coun-
tries. In the USA, where state and local taxes support several important categories of public
expenditure, concern about tax competition has a much longer history but remains, never-
theless, a contentious issue. In recent years, one added source of concern in both the EU and
the USA has been the development of e-commerce, which has exacerbated already existing
pressures on cross-border tax systems (Goolsbee, 2001). Furthermore, in the case of the
EU, increasing economic integration might be an important driver for regional inequalities,
and these inequalities may be further ampliﬁed by tax competition. Since one of the social
cohesion objectives of the EU, as explicitly spelled out by Article 130a of the Amsterdam
Treaty of 1997, is to “aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the
various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions or islands, including
rural areas”, tax competition may have additional indirect costs if it were to exacerbate
spatial inequalities, thus leading to the increased use of structural funds to promote the
development of backward areas.1
While much of the tax competition literature analyzes taxes on capital or corporate prof-
its, there are important tax competition issues that arise for value-added taxes (henceforth,
VAT) and retail sales taxes when consumers can shop in multiple jurisdictions. It is gener-
ally thought that there are two key questions in the design of indirect taxation systems with
cross-border transactions (Keen et al., 2002).2 The ﬁrst question asks where taxes should
be levied. Two alternative regimes are traditionally considered. Under the ‘destination or
consumption-based principle’ (henceforth, DP) tax is paid in the country where goods are
consumed at the rate applied there, while under the ‘origin or production-based principle’
(henceforth, OP) tax is paid in the country where goods are produced at that country’s
rate. Accordingly, local consumption is taxed and exports are exempted under DP, while
local production is taxed and imports are exempted under OP. Once a tax principle has
been agreed on, the second question asks whether tax rates should be set independently
1The EU allocates roughly 35% of its budget to the European Regional Development Funds (195 million
euros for the 2000–2006 period). Of these, almost 70% go to so-called ‘Objective 1 regions’, which are
deﬁned as those regions with an average income of less than 75% of the EU average.
2Our spatial setting diﬀers markedly from the usual models of commodity tax competition focusing on
cross-border shopping. Here, we consider a shipping model in which goods are traded between countries
on segmented markets, and in which ﬁrms choose where to locate and to produce (instead of consumers
choosing where to shop).
3by national governments or rather harmonized to some extent across countries. While the
former case allows for more ﬂexibility in dealing with asymmetric shocks and entices gov-
ernments to exert eﬀort to collect taxes eﬃciently, it may make them engage in harmful
tax competition.
Within the EU, the issues of choice of a tax principle and VAT harmonization are a
recurrent source of debate (European Commission, 2000; Ebrill et al., 2001).3 In particu-
lar, while “the concept of a deﬁnitive system of taxation in the Member State of origin [is]
retained as a long-term Community objective” (European Commission, 2004b, p.1), with
increasing direct cross-border sales to consumers, such a system for all types of transac-
tions (partly motivated by the relative administrative ease for collecting and remitting tax
revenue) has been met with skepticism by many countries which fear losing production and
tax revenue. In the USA, a closely related important issue has been whether or not to close
the use tax evasion loophole that puts increasing strain on local governments’ budgets.4
The Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) is an attempt at getting cooperation among
states in taxation of cross-border purchases.5 This proposal would result in DP treatment
of mail-order and online purchases, and OP treatment of purchases by consumers who
travel out-of-state. As in the EU, this reform proposal has not met with broad agreement,
as shown by state governments’ chronic delays in implementing the necessary regulatory
requirements (Strayhorn, 2005).
The main objective of this paper is to provide a theoretical and numerical analysis
of commodity tax competition, tax harmonization, and industry location in a framework
featuring many ﬁrms, imperfect competition, and variable mark-ups. Our framework to
study tax competition is the one developed by Behrens et al. (forthcoming), which uses
a model of monopolistic competition that generates a linear demand system. This latter
aspect allows us to capture the various impacts that tax incidence and trade costs may
have on the equilibrium tax rates and the spatial distribution of industry. It also allows
us to deal explicitly with spatial market segmentation, the importance of which has been
put forward by empirical research (Engel and Rogers, 1996; Haskel and Wolf, 2001). These
two aspects are usually neglected in the existing literature building on the CES model
(e.g., Hauﬂer and Pﬂ¨ uger, 2004) which, as we argue in this paper, may lead to misleading
results. The downside of using such a rich modeling framework is that analytical results
for the tax competition equilibria are largely out of reach. We, therefore, heavily rely on
3Recent experience with extending existing agreements on reduced VAT rates in construction and hos-
pitality has shown that agreeing on tax matters is likely to get even more diﬃcult in the enlarged EU.
4Every state that levies a retail sales tax also levies a use tax at the same rate, which applies to goods
purchased out-of-state. Enforcement is diﬃcult since the Supreme Court has ruled that out-of-state retailers
cannot be compelled to collect these taxes unless the ﬁrms ‘have nexus’, i.e., do some business within the
purchaser’s state of residence.
5See http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/ for more information.
4numerical analysis and ‘simulate’ the model for a large set of parameter values. This allows
us to assess the robustness of the main ﬁndings and to derive comparative static results by
running simple regressions on our artiﬁcial data set.
We consider a federation of two jurisdictions, each of which maximizes the sum of
its residents’ consumer surplus, returns to locally-owned capital, and the beneﬁts of local
public expenditure. We compare the equilibrium outcomes to two diﬀerent cooperative
outcomes. In the ﬁrst, the federation chooses tax rates in both jurisdictions to maximize
total welfare (optimal tax rates); in the second, the federation chooses a single harmonized
tax rate with the same objective (full harmonization). We also deal with the question of
how a switch from DP to OP for ﬁnal consumption transactions, as initially envisaged by
the European Commission (2004b), may change the equilibrium tax rates and the spatial
distribution of industry. We thus explicitly take into account the fact that a switch from
a ‘consumption tax’ (DP), which falls mostly on immobile consumers, to a ‘production
tax’ (OP), which falls mostly on mobile ﬁrms, will have spatial eﬀects in the long run.
Our results conﬁrm this intuition by showing that the ‘race to the bottom’ is particularly
strong under OP, thus leading to quite low non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates. Yet,
and contrary to the DP where the larger country charges the lower tax rate, the larger
country charges the higher tax rate under OP. As a by-product of this result, the ‘home
market eﬀect’, which in general states that the larger country attracts a disproportionate
share of ﬁrms (Helpman and Krugman, 1985), gets attenuated or reversed, which leads to a
more equal equilibrium industry distribution. A direct policy implication of this ﬁnding is
that, in the absence of tax harmonization, federations like the EU face a non-trivial trade-
oﬀ: more spatial inequality and more tax revenue under DP, or less spatial inequality and
less tax revenue under OP. Because a quite substantial part of the EU’s structural funds,
intended to alleviate spatial inequality and backwardness, are ﬁnanced by national VAT
revenues, the question of whether and how VAT rates and VAT regimes may exacerbate
these inequalities in the ﬁrst place deserves closer attention.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
derives the market outcome. Section 3 then deals with the short run equilibrium and opti-
mum of the tax game, both under DP and OP, taking the spatial distribution of industry as
given. We also discuss the harmonized outcome. Section 4 turns to the long run equilibrium
with internationally mobile ﬁrms. Using both a large grid simulation and a benchmark case,
we investigate how a switch from DP to OP aﬀects equilibrium tax rates and the spatial
distribution of industry. We again discuss the harmonized outcome, taking into account
ﬁrm mobility. Section 5 discusses the policy relevance of our main ﬁndings and concludes.
6During the 1990s, roughly 25-30% of the EU budget was ﬁnanced by member states’ VAT, a ﬁgure that
has dropped to about 15% in recent years since direct ‘gross national income’-based transfers have become
more important.
52 The model
2.1 Preferences and technology
Consider an economy with two countries, labeled H and F, and a unit total mass of
consumers. Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor and one unit of capital. Let
θ ∈ (0,1) denote the share (and mass) of consumers located in country H, which implies
that θ also measures that country’s shares (and masses) of labor and capital. Consumers
are internationally immobile and supply labor only in the country where they reside.7 By
contrast, they are free to supply capital wherever they want. All consumers have identical
quasi-linear utility functions over the consumption of two types of goods, a homogeneous
good Z and a horizontally diﬀerentiated good that is provided as a continuum of varieties
indexed by v ∈ [0,N].8 The former good is costlessly traded across countries, whereas any
variety of the latter good incurs a trade cost of τ > 0 units of good Z per unit of variety
shipped across the two countries. Both types of goods can be costlessly traded within each
country.
The subutility over the varieties of the diﬀerentiated good is quadratic as in Ottaviano

























i Zi = Ri + wi + p
Z
i Z0
where qi(v) and pi(v) are the consumption and the (consumer) price of variety v in country i;
Zi and pZ
i are the consumption and the price of the homogeneous good; Ri is the return to
the agent’s unit of capital; wi is the wage rate; Z0 is a suﬃciently large initial endowment
of the homogeneous good to ensure its consumption in equilibrium; and α > 0, β > γ > 0
are parameters.
The homogeneous good Z is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect com-
petition by using one unit of labor per unit of output. Due to perfect competition and free
trade in that good, proﬁt maximization then implies that pZ
i = wi = 1 in both countries,
where the last equality is our choice of num´ eraire. By contrast, each variety of the dif-
ferentiated good is produced under ﬁrm-level increasing returns to scale and monopolistic
competition, with a ﬁxed requirement φ of capital and a constant marginal requirement m
7In this respect, our model oﬀers a better description of the EU, in which interregional labor mobility
is much lower than in the USA (Faini, 1999).
8Quasi-linear preferences rank far behind homothetic preferences in general equilibrium models of trade.
Yet, Dinopoulos et al. (2006, p.22) show that “quasi-linear preferences behave reasonably well in general-
equilibrium settings”.
6of labor. Because there is a unit mass of capital, capital market clearing then implies that
the total mass of ﬁrms is determined by N = 1/φ.
In what follows, we present expressions for country H only. Symmetric expressions
hold for country F. Because all goods produced in the same country enter consumers’
utility functions symmetrically, we may drop the variety index v in what follows. Denote
by 0 < λ < 1 the share of ﬁrms (and varieties) located in country H. Letting qFH stand
for the consumption in country H of a variety produced in country F. Letting pHH (resp.,
pFH+τ) be the mill (resp., the delivered) consumer price in country H for a variety produced
in country H (resp., F), utility maximization yields the following demand functions






= a − (b + cN)pHH + cPH
qFH = a − (b + cN)(pFH + τ) + cPH (1)
where a ≡ α/[β + (N − 1)γ] expresses the desirability of the diﬀerentiated product with
respect to the num´ eraire; where b ≡ 1/[β + (N − 1)γ] gives the link between individual
and industry demands: consumers become more sensitive to price diﬀerences when b rises;
where c ≡ γ/(β −γ)[β + (N −1)γ] is an inverse measure of the degree of product diﬀeren-
tiation between varieties: when c → ∞, varieties are perfect substitutes, whereas they are
independent for c = 0; and where
PH/N ≡ λpHH + (1 − λ)(pFH + τ) (2)
stands for the average consumer price of the diﬀerentiated good in country H. Using (1)















[λpHH + (1 − λ)(pFH + τ)]
2 .
In what follows, we superscript all relevant variables with d and o under DP and OP,
respectively. A ﬁrm located in country H maximizes its proﬁt given by
ΠH ≡ θ[pHH(1 − t) − m]qHH + (1 − θ)[pHF(1 − t) − m]qHF − rHφ
where (t,t) = (td
H,td
F) under DP, and where (t,t) = (to
H,to
H) under OP. Following Behrens
et al. (forthcoming), we rewrite the proﬁt functions using a device that allows us to treat
an ad valorem tax as a speciﬁc tax and a pure proﬁts tax:










(1 − ¯ t)
￿
qHF − rHφ.










1 + ¯ s
(1 − θ)
￿
pHF − m(1 + ¯ s)
￿
qHF − rHφ (3)
which is our working speciﬁcation. Increasing t (resp., t) amounts to increasing s (resp.,
s). In what follows, we let (s,¯ s) = (sd
H,sd




In accord with empirical evidence, we assume that national product markets are segmented
(Engel and Rogers, 1996; Haskel and Wolf, 2001) and that labor markets are local. Each
ﬁrm, therefore, maximizes its domestic and foreign proﬁts by maximizing each term in
expression (3) independently. Since each ﬁrm is negligible to the market because of the
continuum assumption, it takes the price index (2) as given. Yet, ﬁrms’ pricing decisions
remain interdependent ‘in aggregate’, because each ﬁrm must correctly anticipate what the
average price of the market will be in equilibrium. Thus, our price equilibrium is formally
equivalent to a Nash equilibrium with a continuum of players.
As shown by Behrens et al. (forthcoming), the Nash equilibrium (producer) prices in














with symmetric expressions holding for country F. The equilibrium prices under DP can
























































under OP. Hence, (4) and (5) are consumer prices exclusive of trade costs. Finally, using
these equilibrium prices, the equilibrium individual demands under the two tax principles
can be rewritten as follows:
q
d





















HH = (b + cN)[p
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FH = (b + cN)[p
o
FH − m(1 + s
o
F)].
Symmetric expressions hold for country F.
Throughout this paper, we assume that marginal production cost m and trade costs τ
are suﬃciently low for international demands qHF and qFH to remain strictly positive for
all ﬁrm distributions λ ∈ [0,1] under both tax principles. This is the case if trade costs are



































under OP, which we assume to hold in the analytical developments. Note that conditions
(6) and (7) depend on the tax rates, which are themselves generally endogeneous. This
requires us to check ex post that these conditions are veriﬁed in each step of our numerical
analysis at the equilibrium tax rates.
2.3 Spatial equilibrium
A spatial equilibrium is such that no agent has an incentive to change her international
allocation of capital and such that no ﬁrm has an incentive to enter or exit the market.
These two conditions will hold when no agent can get a higher rental rate by relocating
her capital and when rental rates exactly absorb ﬁrms’ operating proﬁts. Formally, at an
interior spatial equilibrium (0 < λ∗ < 1), we have rH = rF with rH and rF such that the
proﬁts (3) are equal to zero. In what follows, we restrict our analysis to the meaningful
case of interior spatial equilibria only.9
Substituting the equilibrium quantities into the proﬁts (3), the rental rates under DP



















































9The assumption of interior spatial equilibria across countries does not seem too stringent in practice,
especially if one has in mind a more aggregate sectoral structure of the economy at the macro level.
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Under DP, we can easily determine the spatial equilibrium by solving the equation rd
H = rd
F
(see Appendix A.1). Under OP, the spatial equilibrium is the solution to a quadratic
equation that is too complex to allow for a detailed analytical investigation. Behrens et al.
(forthcoming) provide an analysis of the special case where τ = 0. We deal in this paper
numerically with the case where τ > 0.
2.4 Capital and tax revenues
Concerning the proﬁt distribution, we assume that each agent holds a fully diversiﬁed
portfolio and, therefore, has the same claim to her share in world proﬁts. For a given
spatial distribution λ of ﬁrms, the capital revenues RH and RF are equal and given by
RH = RF ≡ λrH+(1−λ)rF. Although this assumption is somewhat particular, it allows us
to cut short a taxonomy of cases that arise under alternative assumptions on the distribution
of capital incomes.10
Tax revenues associated with the tax rates sd
H and sd
F that accrue to the governments







































































Expressions (12) and (13) clearly show that a commodity tax under DP corresponds to a
consumption tax, which is thus proportional to market size θ; whereas a commodity tax
under OP corresponds to a production tax, which is thus proportional to industry size λ.
10Capital market equilibrium requires that rates of return are equal in both jurisdictions in the long run,
so that our assumption is less stringent. Yet, one should keep in mind that the precise ownership pattern
will inﬂuence the tax competition game.
103 Short-run equilibrium and optimum
We start by analyzing the case where governments take the spatial distribution λ of the
industry as given. This may be either due to the fact that capital is relatively immobile
between countries, or because governments do not realize that changing their commodity tax
rates may have an inﬂuence on the spatial structure of the economy. This short-run analysis
provides a benchmark against which we can judge the outcome when the location choices
of ﬁrms are taken into account. Doing so allows us to highlight the relative importance of
factor mobility when deciding on a tax principle or on tax harmonization in the long-run,
an aspect developed in Section 4 below.
3.1 The destination principle
Given our quasi-linear utility function, social welfare in each country may be expressed as
the sum of consumers’ surplus, ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and utility derived from the provision of local
public goods ﬁnanced by local tax revenues. Because of our assumption on the structure of
capital ownership (namely full portfolio diversiﬁcation), and recalling that wages are equal
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where g stands for the concave sub-utility derived from the consumption of the public
good. In what follows, for numerical reasons, we set g( ) ≡ 2
√
 . Assuming that g is a
linear function of T does not reduce the complexity of our model, yet generates additional
diﬃculties because equilibrium tax rates could be zero (or even negative, i.e., consumption
subsidies, as in Hauﬂer and Pﬂ¨ uger, 2004) unless tax revenues enter with a suﬃciently large
weight (see, e.g., Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993).
Since λ is ﬁxed in the short run, the non-cooperative tax equilibrium is a solution to

































































The expressions for the derivatives are given in Appendices A.2 and A.3. Although these
analytical expressions are cumbersome, numerical simulations reveal that W d
H is concave in
sd
H for any given value of sd
F, which then yields a single-valued reaction function and (in
our model) a unique equilibrium (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the short-run welfare
11surface W d
H). In what follows, we denote by sd∗
H and sd∗
F the non-cooperative equilibrium
tax rates under short-run DP.
Insert Figure 1 about here.11
The cooperative equilibrium tax rates, denoted by e sd
H and e sd
F, are such that world welfare
W d ≡ W d
H + W d
F is maximized with respect to sd
H and sd
F. Under DP with segmented
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F < 0 and ∂rd
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F ) = 0
which establishes the following result.
Proposition 1 (short-run ‘race to the top’) Assume that λ is ﬁxed in the short-run.
Then the non-cooperative tax rates sd∗
H and sd∗
F under the destination principle are higher
than the cooperative tax rates e sd
H and e sd
F.
The intuition underlying the result in Proposition 1 is as follows. When country i
changes its tax rate, it directly inﬂuences the proﬁts of ﬁrms located in the other country.
Part of this change feeds back into the income of country-i agents, an eﬀect that is taken into
account by the tax-setter in country i. Yet, the negative externality inﬂicted upon country-
j agents is disregarded. Proposition 1 establishes that in the non-cooperative equilibrium
this negative externality dominates the positive one, so that both countries would beneﬁt
from a coordinated reduction of tax rates.
The degree of excessiveness of equilibrium tax rates, when compared to optimum tax
rates, depends on the countries’ sizes. We can show the following result.
11The parameter values underlying Figure 1 are as follows (recall that λ is ﬁxed in the short run): α = 3,
β = 0.25, γ = 0.2, τ = 0.07, φ = 0.1, λ = 0.52, θ = 0.6 and m = 0.6.
12Proposition 2 (size and excess rates) Assume that λ is ﬁxed in the short-run. The
more similar the two countries are in terms of size, the larger the welfare gains from a
coordinated reduction in tax rates under the destination principle.
Proof. Using the expressions of the rental rate derivatives, as given in Appendix A.2,


















+ θ(1 − θ)[λK3 + (1 − λ)K4] = 0
where Ki, for i = 1,2,3,4, are negative bundles of parameters that do not depend on
θ. Since θ(1 − θ) is maximal when θ = 1/2, we may conclude that the welfare gains are
maximized when θ = 1/2.
Proposition 2 shows that the ﬁscal externality is strongest when both countries are of
roughly equal size. It is weakest when θ is close to 0 or 1, as most of the externality is
internalized by the large country.
3.2 The origin principle
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The non-cooperative equilibrium so∗
H and so∗





























































The expressions for the derivatives are given in Appendices A.3 and A.4. The analytical
expressions are again cumbersome, but numerical simulations over a large grid of admissible
parameter values reveal that W o
H is concave in so
H for any given value of so
F, which then
yields a single-valued reaction function and (in our model) a unique equilibrium. In what
follows, we denote by so∗
H and so∗
F the non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates under short-run
OP.
13The cooperative equilibrium tax rates, denoted by e so
H and e so
F, are obtained by maxi-
mizing total welfare W o ≡ W o
H + W o








































































































































where the right-hand sides are evaluated at the non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates.
Contrary to DP, as discussed in the foregoing, we can no longer clearly sign the residual


























so that the total eﬀect can go either way. Stated diﬀerently, under the short-run OP the
non-cooperative tax rates may a priori be either too low or too high with respect to the
ones chosen in the cooperative outcome. The reason for the possible presence of a race to
the bottom, even when ﬁrms are immobile, is that under OP an increase in the tax rate
is formally equivalent to an increase in ﬁrms’ production costs. Thus, governments have
an incentive to cut rates to make domestic ﬁrms more competitive, thereby diverting tax
revenues from the other country.12
Although the reversal in the rankings of equilibrium and optimum tax rates does not
allow for clear-cut results, we can show that it is linked to basic parameters of the model.
In particular, large values of a and low values of c lead to short-run non-cooperative tax
rates that exceed the ones that would be chosen in the cooperative equilibrium. Stated
diﬀerently, when varieties are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (small c) or when preferences for
the diﬀerentiated good are strong (large a), the short-run equilibrium tax rates will be
ineﬃciently large. The intuition underlying this result is as follows. When a is large or
when c is small, ﬁrms price in the inelastic portion of their demand. Since the rate of tax
pass-through increases with a and c under OP (see Behrens et al., forthcoming), this raises
consumer prices (when c becomes small enough, the pass-through becomes almost 100%).13
12Note that cutting taxes works like export subsidies under OP.
13Because we study ad valorem taxes, the pass-through rate varies even though demand is linear.
14Hence, the negative eﬀect of a tax increase on both home and foreign consumer surplus
comes to dominate the positive eﬀect of such an increase on tax revenues, which then leads
the optimal rates to fall with respect to the equilibrium rates.
3.3 Comparing the two principles
Note ﬁrst that consumer surplus is aﬀected by tax rates only through consumer prices,










































As one can see, consumer prices set by ﬁrms in country H are more sensitive to increases
in local tax rates under DP than under OP, whereas the reverse holds with respect to
consumer prices set by ﬁrms in country F. Thus, consumer surplus in country H is more
sensitive to increases in its own tax rate under DP than under OP, whereas the externality





















The reason is that under DP the tax is a consumption tax, whereas under OP the tax is












which reveals that the diﬀerential sensitivity of consumer surplus with respect to taxes
between the two regimes actually rises with the value of a. Consequently, under OP the
marginal eﬀect on consumer surplus of raising taxes is lower than the corresponding eﬀect
under DP for high values of a, which implies that tax rates will be higher in the former
case than in the latter. This implies that the short-run OP rates may actually exceed the
short-run DP rates for suﬃciently high values of a.
3.4 Impacts of a regime change
It appears to be hopeless to pursue our formal analysis further. This is why we have chosen
to appeal to numerical analysis by means of a simulation plan described below. Speciﬁcally,
our numerical results aim to illustrate our previous ﬁndings and to discuss the possible
15impacts of a regime change and of tax harmonization (see Appendix B for a description
of the methodology and its implementation). We begin with a baseline parameter set
calibrated to yield tax rates in the approximate range of VAT rates in the EU. In addition,
we have chosen parameters that yield plausible values for mark-ups and commodity ﬂows.14




F ) as well as




F) for our baseline parameter set: α = 3, β = 0.25, γ = 0.1,
φ = 0.1, τ ∈ {0.05,0.07}, m = 0.6 and θ ∈ {0.5,0.51,0.52,0.53,0.54,0.55}. Hence, we keep
all parameters ﬁxed except θ and τ because we want to investigate how changes in trade
costs and size asymmetries inﬂuence the tax outcomes.
In order to get an idea of how a switch from DP to OP may change the equilibrium tax
rates when λ is held ﬁxed in the short run, we ﬁnd it relevant to ﬁx λ at a ‘reasonable’
value. We hence choose to hold the spatial distribution of ﬁrms constant at the spatial
equilibrium level in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium under DP: λ = λd(sd∗
H,sd∗
F ).15
Table 1 shows that the gap between OP equilibrium and optimal rates exceeds the DP
gap when countries are of the same size. The magnitude of this eﬀect varies with market
size θ. Starting from the symmetric case (θ = 1/2), as one country grows larger, its DP
equilibrium tax rate falls; by contrast, the equilibrium OP rate rises (and can even exceed
welfare-maximizing rates, as argued in the previous section). Note also that equilibrium
DP rates are less sensitive than OP rates to changes in market size, and that this is more
pronounced for the smaller country. These eﬀects capture the diﬀerence between the two tax
principles, namely ‘consumption’ versus ‘production’ tax. It is also worth pointing out that
the gaps between equilibrium and optimal rates shrink as countries become asymmetric,
which provides an illustration of Proposition 2. To see this more clearly, we may compute
the welfare losses resulting from a switch from cooperative to non-cooperative tax setting:
∆W d(θ = 0.5) = −0.00354 and ∆W d(θ = 0.55) = −0.0032. Clearly, cooperative tax setting
in the short-run is more important when countries are of roughly equal sizes. Yet, note that
the loss due to tax competition is fairly weak in general. In percentage points, the loss
when θ = 0.5 is of 0.021%, and it is of 0.019% when θ = 0.55, thus showing that the welfare
gains from cooperative tax setting are almost negligible under the short-run DP.
Note, ﬁnally, that a switch from DP to OP will reduce equilibrium tax rates in both
countries, but that the fall will be much larger in the small country. For given values of
λ and θ this reduces tax revenues in the small country, thus providing a rationale for why
14Additional theoretical constraints stem from the fact that we focus on interior equilibria only (0 <
λ∗ < 1) in which there is bilateral trade, i.e., conditions (6) and (7) hold at the equilibrium tax rates. This
places restrictions on the degree of asymmetry and the value of trade costs which explain why the intervals
within which parameters are allowed to vary are relatively small.
15We may interpret this as a situation in which the economy is in its long-run DP equilibrium, and in
which governments consider changing to OP without taking into account the subsequent adjustment in λ.
16small countries may be opposed to regime changes in the short run.
4 Long-run equilibrium and optimum
We now relax the restrictive assumption of a ﬁxed spatial distribution λ. Doing so is impor-
tant for several reasons. First, it is well known that factor mobility has an important impact
on non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates (the so-called ‘race to the bottom’ highlighted in
most of the tax competition literature). Disregarding it may thus yield predictions that
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from real world outcomes when ﬁrms are mobile. Second, tax competi-
tion and factor mobility may lead to an uneven spatial distribution of economic activities,
which may pose problems on both eﬃciency and equity grounds in the EU. Since commod-
ity taxation remains a national matter for now, non-cooperative tax setting is bound to
have an impact on the spatial allocation of resources. It is, therefore, of interest to take
into account these long-run eﬀects when assessing the relative desirability of OP or DP.
Unfortunately, given increased complexity, analytical results on comparative statics are
out of reach and we have to rely heavily on numerical simulations. However, for these
simulations to be meaningful, we cannot restrict ourselves to the analysis of what is often
called ‘typical cases’ as a necessarily limited gallery of alternative simulated scenarios would
be of little use in terms of general insight. Hence, to convey a synthetic and systematic
view of the implications of our theoretical model, we prefer to act as follows. First, we
construct a grid of diﬀerent parameter sets k with k = 1,2,...,K. Then, for a given tax
principle, we compute the equilibrium tax rates for each parameter set k. We thus have K
equilibrium tax rates associated with K parameter sets. Finally, by regressing the former
on the latter, the regression coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the ‘average’ impact of the
parameters on the equilibrium tax rates, controlling for changes in the other parameters.16
In constructing the grid, we ﬁx α, the demand intercept, at 3, and β at 0.25 – variations
in these parameters have little eﬀect on the outcomes. We allow θ to vary between 0.5 and
0.55, with steps of 0.01 (H is the larger region whenever population size diﬀers). Trade
cost, τ, varies between 0.03 and 0.15, with steps of 0.02, while unit variable cost, m, ranges
from 0.4 to 1.4, in steps of 0.02. Thus, trade costs vary from 2% to over 10% of marginal
cost. The intensity of preference for variety is measured by β − γ, and we vary γ from 0.1
to 0.2 in steps of 0.05, keeping β ﬁxed. Since the demand intercept equals α/[β+(N −1)γ],
we allow marginal cost to range from 15% to 95% of the demand intercept – implying that
our simulations allow for considerable variation in the demand elasticity.
With 6 values for θ, 7 values of τ, 6 values for m, and 3 values for γ, we have a maximum
16This holds true provided one approximates linearly the non-linear relationships between the equilibrium
tax rates and the parameters, as implied by the theoretical model.
17of 756 possible simulation results. We conduct our simulations on this large grid only for
the long-run equilibrium outcomes of the tax competition game. Our simulations yield
interior solutions with positive trade ﬂows across both regions for 629 of a possible 756
cases under DP, and for 464 cases under OP.17 The intersection of interior solutions, with
positive trade ﬂows across regions and no full agglomeration of ﬁrms, under both OP and
DP results in 444 cases.
Figures 2 and 3 display histograms for the simulations (using only the 444 cases valid
under both principles). Equilibrium tax rates under DP vary from 5.96% to 22.7% for
region H; rates in the smaller region are always higher, with a maximum diﬀerence of
2.7%. Equilibrium tax rates under OP range from 0.1% to 6.0% for region H; rates in the
smaller region are always lower with a maximum diﬀerence of 1.0%. For the larger region,
OP rates range from less than 2% to 28% of DP rates and are thus substantially smaller
than DP rates. It should not be a surprise that these large diﬀerences in tax rates cause
welfare to always be greater under DP, with the percentage diﬀerence varying from 3.2%
to 12.9%.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here.
The equilibrium distribution, λ∗, of ﬁrms and capital across regions varies from 0.572 to
0.972 under DP when θ = 0.55, and from 0.542 to 0.827 under OP. This shows that there
is always more spatial inequality under DP than under OP when regions are not of the
same size. Furthermore, a reverse home market eﬀect (identiﬁed as a theoretical possibility
in Behrens et al. (forthcoming) when tax rates are exogenously ﬁxed) can occur in a tax
competition equilibrium: the share of ﬁrms in the larger region is less than the share of
consumers in that region.
Table 2 reports the regression results computed for our grid sample. The dependent
variables are the tax rates under DP and OP, the capital distribution under DP and OP,
as well as the corresponding gaps between regions and tax principles. The explanatory
variables are the four parameters we vary in the simulations. We use all 444 cases for the
tax rates and the diﬀerence across tax principles, while we focus only upon the cases in
which θ  = 0.5 for tax diﬀerences across regions and for the share of capital in the large
region (when θ = 0.5, tax rates are equal and λ∗ = 0.5). All but 2 of the 40 regression
coeﬃcients have t-statistics greater than 3 (and many are much higher), and adjusted R2
values consistently exceed 0.8.
17All simulations converge for DP, whereas some of them did not converge for OP, but these appear to
be cases where corner solutions or arbitrarily low tax rates would obtain. Using a ﬁner simulation grid or
larger parameter ranges yields a larger sample but leads also to more corner solutions. In any case, this
does not modify the qualitative conclusions derived in the remainder of this paper.
18As one can see from Table 2, increases in θ raise tax rates in the large region H under
DP, and lowers rates in H under OP, while tax diﬀerentials rise with θ under DP and
fall under OP. Increases in τ raise tax rates under both DP and OP, with a greater eﬀect
under OP. Increases in m lower tax rates under both principles, while increases in γ raise
rates under both principles. This latter eﬀect is due to the fact that when goods are very
diﬀerentiated, substantial trade takes place so that governments have a stronger incentive
to attract ﬁrms to save on trade costs. This exacerbates tax competition and drives down
rates. Increases in θ, τ, and m reduce the diﬀerence between DP and OP rates, while
increases in γ widen this gap. Note, ﬁnally, that increases in θ increase λ∗ more than one-
for-one (the home market eﬀect holds on average), and that this eﬀect is more pronounced
under DP. Increases in τ, m and γ also reduce λ∗ under both principles, and again the
eﬀect is greater under DP.
4.1 The destination principle
We now return to our baseline parameter values that yield rates close to EU levels. Table 3
presents both short-run and long-run equilibria under DP, where an L subscript denotes
the long-run values. For our baseline parameter set (and for the others we tried), equilib-
rium rates change relatively little when capital mobility is taken into account. Long-run
equilibrium rates are always less than welfare-maximizing rates, but the two stay within two
percentage points of each other. Diﬀerences in market size have only small eﬀects of rates.
Capital mobility does not seem to lead to a vigorous race to the bottom under DP, which
may explain why increases in capital mobility in the EU have had little eﬀect on national
VAT rates to date.
Note, ﬁnally, that the spatial distribution of industry becomes more even in the long-run
equilibrium ((λd)L < λd). This is due to the fact that the tax gap between the large and
the small country shrinks when moving from the short- to the long-run. Yet, at the welfare
maximizing long-run rates, the spatial allocation of industry would still be more equal
than in the long-run equilibrium ((e λd)L < (λd)L). Stated diﬀerently, the non-cooperative
outcome leads to excessive agglomeration in the large country.
4.2 The origin principle
We explore the consequences of a shift to using OP for VAT in two steps. First, at the
spatial equilibrium under DP equilibrium taxes ((λd)L), we solve for short-run equilibrium
tax rates under OP. As shown by Table 4, while this change lowers rates, it is not dramatic
(and it is a more damped response than the switch in short-run equilibrium rates from DP
to OP). Second, we consider the eﬀect of changing from DP to OP when countries take
19account of capital mobility in both games (see Figure 4 for an illustration of the long-run
OP welfare surface W o
H, and Figure 5 for an illustration of the global long-run welfare
surface W o). As shown by Table 3, the race to the bottom is especially pronounced in this
case – rates fall to less than 2% for our baseline simulations. The strong opposition to
recent proposals by the EU to switch to the origin principle appears to have a strong basis
– competition for mobile capital would place a great strain on national budgets.
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here.18
While the tremendous diﬀerence in the levels of tax rates between the two principles
swamps most other considerations, asymmetries have diﬀerent eﬀects on tax rates. Under
DP, as countries become asymmetric, the larger country reduces its tax rate and the smaller
country raises its rate (as in the short run). In contrast, under OP, it is the smaller country
that cuts its rate and the larger country that raises its rate, thus considerably dampening
the home market eﬀect – λ is much less responsive to increases in θ under the OP (as in
Table 2). Hence, when spatial considerations matter (as they surely do in the EU), we
cannot dismiss the OP out of hand on the sole basis that it may put pressure on national
governments’ tax revenues. We return to this point later in the policy discussion.
Tables 5 and 6 present welfare comparisons under the two tax principles. Not surpris-
ingly, given the magnitude of the diﬀerent eﬀects of tax competition, competition barely
aﬀects welfare under DP and the welfare losses are thus small (∆W d∗
H and ∆W d∗
F ), whereas
welfare losses under OP (∆W o∗
H and ∆W o∗
F ) are between 4 and 9% relative to the coopera-
tive outcome, which are close to the welfare changes across the two principles at equilibrium
rates.
4.3 Harmonizing tax rates
Concerns about tax competition as factors become increasingly mobile has led many feder-
ations to consider reducing the ﬂexibility of member states in setting their tax rates. There
have been EU proposals to place ﬂoors under tax rates or to require members to choose tax
rates in a band around EU average rates. In the USA, states have considerable freedom
under the Constitution to choose tax rates and systems, so this has not been a major issue.
Within each state, however, local governments obtain all authority to levy taxes and to
set tax rates from the state government. State governments have a large variety of policy
instruments to prevent tax exporting by local jurisdictions, including setting minimum and
maximum rates for particular taxes. An extreme form of preventing tax competition is to
18The parameter values underlying Figures 4 and 5 are as follows: α = 3, β = 0.25, γ = 0.2, τ = 0.07,
φ = 0.1, θ = 0.55 and m = 0.6.
20take a tax base from local governments and rebate revenue from the tax at a common rate
to all local governments in proportion to their shares of that tax base.19
We have already solved for the optimum tax rates under DP and OP. The optimal rates
when taking capital mobility into account diﬀer from the short-run welfare maximizing
rates, but not by very much (for θ = 1/2, rates are the same in the short and long run and
for either of the principles). In practice, it may be quite diﬃcult for a federation to force
jurisdictions to levy diﬀerent tax rates (as opposed to letting countries choose tax rates
within a band). It is therefore instructive to consider the issue of complete harmonization
where the federation chooses a single tax rate for all countries.20
Tables 7 and 8 present harmonization outcomes under DP and OP in comparison with
equilibrium and optimum rates. For DP, the harmonized rate (subscripted with har) lies
between the optimal rates and above both countries’ equilibrium rates. Increasing tax
rates and eliminating the gap between them reduce spatial inequalities, although this eﬀect
is quantitatively small. The harmonized rate is also quite insensitive to asymmetries in
country size. The welfare losses from harmonization are relatively small under DP, as can
be seen from ∆W d har
H and ∆W d har
F in Table 6. It is worth noting that the large country
loses and the small country gains relative to the cooperative outcome, which suggests that
large countries are less likely to agree to give up their tax-setting powers under DP.
The eﬀects of harmonization under OP are quite diﬀerent. The harmonized rate is
slightly less than the minimum of the optimal rates and considerably higher than the
equilibrium rates. As countries become more asymmetric, the harmonized rate falls yet
this change is quite small. Most surprisingly, the harmonized rate leads to more ﬁrms
locating in the larger country – the spatial inequalities are almost as strong as under long-
run equilibrium rates under DP. This eﬀect stems from the fact that in equilibrium the
larger country charges higher tax rates under OP than the small country, which reduces
ﬁrms’ incentive to agglomerate in the large country. Since tax harmonization eliminates
this stabilizing mechanism, the spatial inequalities naturally increase in the presence of
harmonization.
Along with the concentration of ﬁrms in the large country, Table 6 reveals that the
small country loses in a move from the optimum to the harmonized rates, while the large
country gains. Thus, under OP, a move to reduce the tax gap between countries leads
19In the EU, a minimum VAT rate of 15% has been introduced. In California, the state sales tax includes
a 1.25% rate which goes to the local government where the sale occurred. Local government can levy an
additional 1.25%, so the mandated portion is only a ﬂoor. While the mandated portion may have been an
attempt to reduce tax competition, it has led to competition for retail centers through zoning (Lewis and
Barbour, 1999).
20We do not consider the possibility of revenue transfers between regions by the federation. If the tax
base originally belonged to the regional governments, agreements on rates to reduce the impact of tax
competition may be much simpler than regional transfers.
21to greater inequality, both in welfare and spatial terms. While harmonized outcomes are
clearly better for both countries than tax competition, the distributional implications may
make agreement diﬃcult. Contrary to the DP case, it is now the small countries which are
less likely to agree to give up their tax-setting powers.
4.4 Tax competition and the spatial distribution of ﬁrms
Changes in the tax principle and changes in the type of tax competition not only aﬀect tax
rates and welfare, but they also inﬂuence the degree of spatial inequality in the economy.
In a model comparable to ours, Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) have shown that there
is usually too much agglomeration in equilibrium, so tax diﬀerentials provide an instrument
to reduce spatial inequality and increase welfare. The spatial allocation of capital under
non-cooperative short run DP (λd in Table 1) exhibits a strong home market eﬀect. Behrens
et al. (forthcoming) have shown that symmetric increases in tax rates reduce the magnitude
of the home market eﬀect because higher taxes reduce overall demand for all varieties.
A switch from short-run to long-run equilibrium taxes under DP reduces spatial in-
equality slightly (for θ = 0.55 and τ = 0.05 from 0.786 to 0.765, or for τ = 0.07 from 0.704
to 0.689; see Table 3). This seems puzzling at ﬁrst since tax competition leads to lower
equilibrium rates in the long run, which should strengthen the home market eﬀect. Yet,
higher tax rates in the smaller region reduce demand in that region more than in the larger
region, hence making exports from the larger region a smaller part of each ﬁrm’s production
(in contrast, ﬁrms in the smaller region export proportionally more). Since equilibrium long
run DP tax rates are below optimal rates, the spatial distribution of ﬁrms at optimal tax
rates is more equal, although the eﬀect seems small in magnitude. Because the long run
optimal tax rates under DP result in higher tax rates in the smaller region, harmonization
reduces spatial inequalities.
Table 4 compares the long-run spatial allocation under DP to that under OP. Tax rates
fall dramatically with the shift to OP (which strengthens the home market eﬀect), but
under OP, it is the larger region which charges the higher tax rates. The tax diﬀerential
favors ﬁrms producing in the smaller region for sales both at home and abroad. Roughly,
the switch from DP to OP cuts the magnitude of the home market eﬀect in half. Switching
from equilibrium to optimal tax rates under OP in the long-run actually reverses the home
market eﬀect considerably (the share of ﬁrms in the larger region is less than the share
of consumers in that region). This eﬀect has two sources: much higher tax rates reduce
the home market eﬀect and the tax diﬀerential favors the smaller region, which is strong
enough for the reversal. Because the equilibrium and optimal tax diﬀerentials favor the
smaller region under OP, harmonization results in more spatial inequality, approximately
the same degree as we ﬁnd with harmonization under DP.
225 Policy relevance and conclusions
As argued previously, the questions of which tax principle should be used and whether
commodity tax rates should be harmonized are important but contentious issues in sev-
eral federations like the EU and the USA. Switching from one principle to the other or
harmonizing rates is unlikely to leave the economies of member states unaﬀected, both in
the short and in the long run. The most visible short-run impact is that of tax revenue
redistribution among the various national and local tax authorities of the federation. It is,
for example, estimated that a switch from OP to DP for Texas in-state shipments under
the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) could “cause a redistribution of local sales tax
revenues from larger urban areas, where goods are purchased to smaller, suburban and
rural areas where they are delivered. As much as $160 million in local sales tax revenue
could be redistributed in such a manner” (Strayhorn, 2005, p.1). Given the magnitude of
the ﬁgures, the redistribution of tax revenue attracts the most attention from economists
and policy makers. Yet, we have argued that one may miss an important part of the
story by focusing exclusively on the direct short-run eﬀects and by neglecting the indirect
long-run eﬀects. The latter mainly stem from the redistribution of industry, which may
adjust location in order to better exploit tax-diﬀerentials across regions. Firms’ locational
incentives are themselves largely conditioned by the tax principle applied to commodity
transactions. A switch from a ‘consumption based’ tax principle (DP), which falls mainly
on immobile consumers, to a ‘production based’ tax principle (OP), which falls mainly
on mobile producers, may have important long-run consequences by providing ﬁrms with
stronger incentives to relocate to low-tax regions. This eﬀect is further ampliﬁed by the
fact that, in the case of DP, ﬁrms established in diﬀerent locations only diﬀer by the tax
rates they face for selling to local consumers; whereas under OP they diﬀer by the tax rate
for selling to all consumers in the federation. In our model of tax competition, these two
eﬀects of a switch from DP to OP translate into a ﬁerce ‘race to the bottom’, leading to
excessively low tax rates and a strong erosion in tax revenues. This result suggests that
some form of ﬁscal harmonization may be desirable to prevent harmful tax competition
under OP. On the contrary, welfare losses due to non-cooperative tax-setting under DP are
quite low in general, so that harmonization does not appear to be necessary in that case.
Note that the foregoing results are in line with the ones one may expect in most models of
tax competition when considering switching the tax burden from the immobile to the mobile
agents. Our analysis goes further by highlighting the spatial impacts of such a change in tax
principle. This aspect may be quite important for federations with commitment to some
regional cohesion objective. We have shown that under DP tax competition, by lowering
equilibrium tax rates slightly below the optimal tax rates, leads to more spatial inequality,
which may interfere with regional cohesion objectives and, therefore, generate additional
23costs in the form of transfer payments aimed at reducing spatial inequalities.
Concerning the potential impacts of a switch from DP to OP, we have shown that tax
revenues decrease signiﬁcantly whereas the spatial distribution of ﬁrms becomes more even
because the larger region sets the higher equilibrium tax rate. Stated diﬀerently, although
tax revenues decrease, so does spatial inequality. Since there is a tendency for excess
agglomeration in equilibrium (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005), less agglomeration may
actually be welfare improving as less structural funds are required to alleviate regional
inequalities. How tax revenue and spatial inequality are traded oﬀ is, ultimately, a political
and societal question of the ‘eﬃciency vs equity’ type to which our model can provide
no answer. The gains from switching to OP are lower costs of collecting and remitting
tax revenues, as well as less spatial inequality, whereas the costs are lower tax revenues.
Although this trade oﬀ can only be resolved by knowing society’s ‘aversion for spatial
inequality’, which we have not speciﬁed in our model, it is important to point out that
given the magnitudes of welfare diﬀerences under OP and DP (see Table 9 for a summary
of the ﬁgures) in our model, it is unlikely that forcing a more equal spatial distribution under
OP oﬀsets the high costs in terms of foregone tax revenue. A switch to an origin-based
commodity taxation may therefore put strain on the integration process and undermine
the ﬁnancing of the welfare state, triggering strong resistance especially from the large
contributing regions.21
To conclude, we ﬁnd that there is no general presumption in favor of OP based com-
modity taxation. Neither is there in favor to DP based commodity taxation. This ﬁnding
may explain why proposals to reform commodity taxation, as advocated by some members
in the EU and in the USA, have not met broad agreement and quick implementation of
changes by the other members.
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Appendix A: Analytical expressions
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A.2. Short-run DP derivatives: We can calculate the derivatives component by com-



























































































































































































































































































































































































The derivatives of the rental rates are all strictly negative under the trade feasibility con-
ditions (6) and (7).





























































































































A.4. Short-run OP derivatives: We can calculate the derivatives component by com-





= {−a + (b + cN)p
o
HH − cN [λp
o







+{−a + (b + cN)(p
o
FH + τ) − cN [λp
o
HH + (1 − λ)(p
o









= {−a + (b + cN)(p
o
HF + τ) − cN [λ(p
o







+{−a + (b + cN)p
o
FF − cN [λ(p
o












= {−a + (b + cN)p
o
HH − cN [λp
o







+{−a + (b + cN)(p
o
FH + τ) − cN [λp
o
HH + (1 − λ)(p
o









= {−a + (b + cN)(p
o
HF + τ) − c[λ(p
o







+{−a + (b + cN)p
o
FF − cN [λ(p
o








28Derivatives of the tax revenues get a bit more complicated: Using the expressions of the
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29Appendix B: Numerical implementation
The implementation of the short run analysis is quite straightforward, since all analytical
expressions can be established in closed form (see Appendix A). Note also that we can
readily compute that equilibrium allocation under DP (as given in Appendix A.1) and
derive all the short run results with a ﬁxed distribution λ.
The long run analysis under OP is more involved since it requires solving a quadratic
equation that usually is too complicated to handle analytically when τ > 0 (see Behrens
et al., 2006). Yet we can handle this problem numerically as follows. Under OP, the rental
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The spatial equilibrium is a solution to the quadratic equation ro
H = ro
F. All λ terms are














A spatial equilibrium allocation of capital corresponds to ∆(λ∗) = 0. For a stable equilib-
rium, if λ > λ∗, then ∆(λ;so
H,so
F) < 0. Thus, a stable equilibrium has d∆/dλ < 0. Given






2 + Bλ + C = 0.
Since d∆/dλ = 2Aλ + B, the sign of A determines which root is the stable one (negative
derivative with respect to λ in the neighborhood of the root). If A > 0, the smaller root
(the one subtracting the discriminant) is stable, while if A < 0, the larger root is the
stable one. Writing λ∗ = −B/2A ±
√
B2 − 4AC/2A, the stable root always subtracts the
discriminant. Note, ﬁnally, that when so
F =so
H, the equation is linear in λ. Since B < 0,
the linear equation solution is always stable.
An easier approach that we can use if there is only one solution with 0 < λ < 1 (which












































































































































Using a strictly increasing logistic transformation of λ, i.e.,





as the variable the non-linear equation solver is searching over, we can evaluate the deriva-
tive of λ with respect to so
H and so
F numerically in a straightforward way. We implemented
this procedure using Matlab and the associated optimization toolbox.
To double-check the results, we also used Mathematica to solve formally for the implicit
function expressions of the derivatives dλ/dso
H and dλ/dso
F, which are then subsequently
used in the computations of the equilibrium and optimum tax rates. Both the Matlab and
Mathematica programs are available upon request and yield the same numerical results for
our benchmark parameter sets.
31Table 1 — Short-run destination- and origin-principle tax equilibria.
θ τ td∗
H td∗







0.5 0.05 0.2109 0.2109 0.5 0.1971 0.1971 0.1507 0.1507 0.1971 0.1971
0.51 0.05 0.2075 0.2144 0.5573 0.1940 0.2003 0.1551 0.1472 0.2014 0.1922
0.52 0.05 0.2042 0.2180 0.6146 0.1910 0.2036 0.1616 0.1450 0.2046 0.1871
0.53 0.05 0.2009 0.2217 0.6719 0.1881 0.2070 0.1694 0.1443 0.2060 0.1817
0.54 0.05 0.1978 0.2254 0.7290 0.1853 0.2105 0.1788 0.1449 0.2043 0.1762
0.55 0.05 0.1947 0.2293 0.7861 0.1825 0.2142 0.1901 0.1473 0.1987 0.1704
0.5 0.07 0.2114 0.2114 0.5 0.1972 0.1972 0.1479 0.1479 0.1972 0.1972
0.51 0.07 0.2080 0.2149 0.5408 0.1941 0.2004 0.1508 0.1455 0.2003 0.1939
0.52 0.07 0.2047 0.2185 0.5816 0.1911 0.2037 0.1543 0.1437 0.2029 0.1903
0.53 0.07 0.2014 0.2222 0.6223 0.1882 0.2072 0.1584 0.1424 0.2047 0.1866
0.54 0.07 0.1983 0.2260 0.6630 0.1854 0.2107 0.1631 0.1418 0.2055 0.1827
0.55 0.07 0.1952 0.2299 0.7036 0.1827 0.2144 0.1686 0.1417 0.2050 0.1787
Notes: m = 0.6, β = 0.25, γ = 0.2, α = 3, K = 1.0,φ = 0.1 (N = 10)









H λ∗ λ∗ λ∗ − λ∗
Tax principle DP OP DP OP DP − OP DP OP DP − OP
# Obs. 444 444 363 363 444 363 363 363
Coeﬃcient: θ −0.13 0.02 0.34 −0.10 −0.15 4.64 2.54
θ −0.13 0.02 0.34 −0.10 −0.15 4.64 2.54 2.11
(−3.30) (1.83) (43.76) (−36.07) (−4.33) (30.93) (24.24) (32.65)
τ 0.07 0.26 0.01 −0.02 −0.19 −1.17 −0.47 −0.69
(3.07) (35.53) (1.67) (−13.97) (−9.36) (−16.25) (−9.48) (−22.42)
m −0.06 −0.01 −0.001 0.003 −0.05 −0.07 −0.05 −0.02
(−31.14) (−14.14) (−4.42) (22.81) (−29.56) (−11.01) (−10.46) (−8.65)
γ 1.00 0.29 0.09 −0.01 0.70 −2.14 −1.36 −0.78
(50.53) (45.95) (26.53) (−5.67) (39.70) (−33.76) (−30.74) (−28.70)
Adj. R2 0.90 0.85 0.89 0.85 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.84
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis





F )L (λd)L (e td
H)L (e td
F)L (e λd)L
0.5 0.05 0.2109 0.2109 0.5000 0.1824 0.1824 0.5 0.1971 0.1971 0.5
0.51 0.05 0.2075 0.2144 0.5573 0.1801 0.1848 0.5535 0.1948 0.1994 0.5531
0.52 0.05 0.2042 0.2180 0.6146 0.1778 0.1874 0.6070 0.1926 0.2018 0.6061
0.53 0.05 0.2009 0.2217 0.6719 0.1757 0.1900 0.6604 0.1905 0.2043 0.6592
0.54 0.05 0.1978 0.2254 0.7209 0.1736 0.1928 0.7139 0.1884 0.2068 0.7122
0.55 0.05 0.1947 0.2293 0.7801 0.1716 0.1957 0.7674 0.1863 0.2094 0.7652
0.5 0.07 0.2114 0.2114 0.5 0.1830 0.1830 0.5 0.1972 0.1972 0.5
0.51 0.07 0.2080 0.2149 0.5408 0.1807 0.1855 0.5381 0.1950 0.1996 0.5378
0.52 0.07 0.2047 0.2185 0.5816 0.1784 0.1880 0.5761 0.1928 0.2020 0.5755
0.53 0.07 0.2014 0.2222 0.6223 0.1763 0.1907 0.6142 0.1906 0.2045 0.6132
0.54 0.07 0.1983 0.2260 0.6630 0.1742 0.1935 0.6523 0.1885 0.2070 0.6510
0.55 0.07 0.1952 0.2299 0.7036 0.1722 0.1964 0.6903 0.1865 0.2096 0.6887
Notes: m = 0.6, β = 0.25, γ = 0.2, α = 3, K = 1.0,φ = 0.1 (N = 10)
Table 4 — Switch from long-run DP to short- and long-run OP.
θ τ (td∗
H )L (td∗





0.5 0.05 0.1824 0.1824 0.5000 0.1507 0.1507 0.0078 0.0078 0.5000
0.51 0.05 0.1801 0.1848 0.5535 0.1550 0.1475 0.0081 0.0074 0.5248
0.52 0.05 0.1778 0.1874 0.6070 0.1605 0.1454 0.0084 0.0071 0.5497
0.53 0.05 0.1757 0.1900 0.6604 0.1673 0.1444 0.0088 0.0067 0.5745
0.54 0.05 0.1736 0.1928 0.7139 0.1756 0.1446 0.0092 0.0063 0.5994
0.55 0.05 0.1716 0.1957 0.7674 0.1854 0.1462 0.0096 0.0060 0.6244
0.5 0.07 0.1830 0.1830 0.5000 0.1479 0.1479 0.0140 0.0140 0.5000
0.51 0.07 0.1807 0.1855 0.5381 0.1505 0.1457 0.0145 0.0136 0.5186
0.52 0.07 0.1784 0.1880 0.5761 0.1536 0.1440 0.0150 0.0131 0.5372
0.53 0.07 0.1763 0.1907 0.6142 0.1573 0.1427 0.0154 0.0126 0.5558
0.54 0.07 0.1742 0.1935 0.6523 0.1614 0.1420 0.0159 0.0122 0.5744
0.55 0.07 0.1722 0.1964 0.6903 0.1661 0.1417 0.0164 0.0117 0.5931
Notes: m = 0.6, β = 0.25, γ = 0.2, α = 3, K = 1.0,φ = 0.1 (N = 10)
33Table 5 — Welfare impacts of non-cooperative tax setting under long-run DP.
maximal welfare changes with respect to maximal welfare
θ τ f W d
H f W d
F ∆W d∗
H in % ∆W d∗
F in % ∆W d har
H in % ∆W d har
F in %
0.5 0.07 8.3110 8.3110 -0.0220 -0.0220 0 0
0.51 0.07 8.4726 8.1495 -0.0191 -0.0249 -0.0151 0.0144
0.52 0.07 8.6342 7.9881 -0.0162 -0.0279 -0.0308 0.0279
0.53 0.07 8.7958 7.8268 -0.0133 -0.0308 -0.0466 0.0403
0.54 0.07 8.9573 7.6656 -0.0105 -0.0337 -0.0626 0.0511
0.55 0.07 9.1189 7.5046 -0.0079 -0.0365 -0.0786 0.0602
Notes: m = 0.6, β = 0.25, γ = 0.2, α = 3, K = 1.0,φ = 0.1 (N = 10)
Table 6 — Welfare impacts of non-cooperative tax setting under long-run OP.
maximal welfare changes with respect to maximal welfare
θ τ f W o
H f W o
F ∆W o∗
H in % ∆W o∗
F in % ∆W o har
H in % ∆W o har
F in %
0.5 0.07 8.3110 8.3110 -6.5286 -6.5286 0 0
0.51 0.07 8.4487 8.1733 -6.0393 -7.0336 0.7808 -0.8319
0.52 0.07 8.5864 8.0355 -5.5650 -7.5552 1.5134 -1.7182
0.53 0.07 8.7240 7.8978 -5.1049 -8.0941 2.2002 -2.6626
0.54 0.07 8.8616 7.7599 -4.6616 -8.6514 2.8434 -3.6694
0.55 0.07 8.9991 7.6221 -4.2252 -9.2281 3.4450 -4.7440
Notes: m = 0.6, β = 0.25, γ = 0.2, α = 3, K = 1.0,φ = 0.1 (N = 10)
Table 7 — Tax harmonization under the destination principle.
θ (td∗
H )L (td∗
F )L (λd)L (e td
H)L (e td
F)L (e λd)L (td
har)L (λd
har)L
0.5 0.1830 0.1830 0.5 0.1972 0.1972 0.5 0.1972 0.5
0.51 0.1807 0.1855 0.5381 0.1950 0.1996 0.5378 0.1972 0.5317
0.52 0.1784 0.1880 0.5761 0.1928 0.2020 0.5755 0.1972 0.5634
0.53 0.1763 0.1907 0.6142 0.1906 0.2045 0.6132 0.1971 0.5950
0.54 0.1742 0.1935 0.6523 0.1885 0.2070 0.6510 0.1970 0.6267
0.55 0.1722 0.1964 0.6903 0.1865 0.2096 0.6887 0.1969 0.6584
Notes: m = 0.6, β = 0.25, γ = 0.2, α = 3, K = 1.0,φ = 0.1 (N = 10), τ = 0.07
34Table 8 — Tax harmonization under the origin principle.
θ (t∗o
H)L (t∗o
F )L (λo)L (e to
H)L (e to
F)L (e λo)L (to
har)L (λo
har)L
0.5 0.0140 0.0140 0.5 0.1972 0.1972 0.5 0.1972 0.5
0.51 0.0145 0.0136 0.5186 0.1979 0.1966 0.5019 0.1971 0.5316
0.52 0.0150 0.0131 0.5372 0.1986 0.1959 0.5038 0.1967 0.5634
0.53 0.0154 0.0126 0.5558 0.1992 0.1953 0.5057 0.1960 0.5951
0.54 0.0159 0.0122 0.5744 0.1999 0.1946 0.5076 0.1950 0.6268
0.55 0.0164 0.0117 0.5931 0.2005 0.1940 0.5094 0.1938 0.6586
Notes: m = 0.6, β = 0.25, γ = 0.2, α = 3, K = 1.0,φ = 0.1 (N = 10), τ = 0.07
Table 9 — Welfare changes and spatial changes between OP and DP.





F (∆WH)% (∆WF)% (λd∗)L (λo∗)L (∆λ)%
0.5 8.3444 8.3444 7.7098 7.7098 8.23% 8.23% 0.5000 0.5000 0.0%
0.51 8.5070 8.1818 7.8807 7.5390 7.86% 8.53% 0.5531 0.5248 5.4%
0.52 8.6696 8.0193 8.0515 7.3682 7.68% 8.84% 0.6061 0.5497 10.26%
0.53 8.8323 7.8570 8.2224 7.1975 7.42% 9.16% 0.6592 0.5745 14.47%
0.54 8.9950 7.6948 8.3932 7.0267 7.17% 9.51% 0.7122 0.5994 18.82%
0.55 9.1576 7.5327 8.5641 6.8560 6.93% 9.87% 0.7652 0.6244 22.55%

























Figure 1. Welfare surface W d
H(sd
H,sd









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Welfare surface W o
H(so
H,so



















Figure 5. Global welfare surface W o(so
H,so
F) under long-run OP
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